Gleanings from Dugald Stewart's works, with additions

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GLEANINGS

FROM

Dugald Stewarts Works,

WITH ADDITIONS.

Influence of Opinions on Happiness.

SELECTED, PREPARED AND PUBLISHED

M(

0

BY

ROSS WINANS.

BALTIMORE:

JOHN P. DES FORGES

1872.

:^%^

GLEANINGS

By Opinions are here meant, not merely
speculative conclusions to which we have
given our assent, but convictions which have
taken root in the mind, and have an habitual
influence on the conduct,

Of these opinions a very great and impor-
tant part are, in the case of all mankind,
interwoven by education with their first habit
of thinking ; or are insensibly imbibed from
the manners of the times.

Where such opinions are erroneous, they
may often be corrected, to a great degree, by
the persevering efforts of a reflecting and a
vigorous mind ; but as the number of minds
capable of reflection is comparatively small,
it becomes a duty on all who have themselves
experienced the happy effects of juster and
more elevated principles to impart, as far as
they are able, the same blessing to others.

To habituate the minds of children to those
occupations and enjoyments which afford the
most genuine and substantial satisfaction is of
the utmost importance : and if education were
judiciously employed to second, in this respect
the recommendations of nature, the charms of
life would be the greater.

Choose that course of action — says Pytha-
goras-—which is best, and custom will soon
render it the most agreeable.

The foregoing remarks relate to what may
be called the essentials of happiness ; — the
circumstances wThich constitute the general
state or habit of mind, that is necessary to lay
a ground work for every other enjoyment.

This foundation being supposed, the sum of
happiness enjoyed by an individual will be
proportioned to the degree in which he is able
to secure all the various pleasures belonging
to our nature.

These pleasures may be referred to the
following heads : —

1. The pleasures of Activity and Repose.

2. The pleasures of Sense.

3. The pleasures of Imagination.

4. The pleasures of the Understanding.

5. The pleasures of the Heart.

The wisest plan of economy, with respect
to our pleasures, is not merely compatible
with a strict observance of the rules of mor-
ality, but is, in a great measure, compre-
hended in these rules, and therefore, that the
happiness, as well as the perfection of our
nature, consists in doing our duty, with as
little solicitude about the event as is consis-
tent with the weakness of humanitv.

He, whose ruling principle of action is a
sense of Duty, conducts himself in the busi-
ness of life with boldness, consistency, and
dignity, finds himself rewarded by that happi-
ness which so often eludes the pursuit of those
who exert every faculty of the mind, in order
to attain it.

The various duties of life agree with each
other in one common quality, that of being
obligatory on rational and voluntary agents ;
and they are all enjoined by the same authori-
ty ; — the authority of conscience. These
duties, therefore, are but different articles of
one law, which is properly expressed by the
word Virtue ; [or still more unequivocably, by
the phrase, Moral Law of Nature.]

A man, whose ruling or habitual principle
of action is a sense of Duty, or a regard to

6

what is Right, may be properly denominated
Virtuous.

The practice of morality, is facilitated by
repeated acts ; and, therefore the word Virtue,
may with propriety be employed to express
that habit of mind which it is the great object
of a good man to confirm.

A sense of duty, and an enlightened regard
to our own happiness, conspire in most in-
stances to give the same direction to our con-
duct, so as to put it beyond a doubt that, even
in this world, a virtuous life is true wisdom.
Both from experience and reflection, we learn
the connexion between virtue and happiness ;
and, consequently, the great lessons of mor-
ality which are obvious to the capacity of all
mankind could never have been suggested to
them merely by a regard to their own interest.
Indeed, this discovery which experience makes
to us of the connexion between virtue and
happiness, both in the case of individuals and
of political societies, furnishes one of the most
pleasing subjects of speculation to the phi-
losopher, as it places in a striking point of
view the unity of design which takes place in
our constitution, and opens encouraging and

delightful prospects with respect to the moral
government of the Deity.

The man who is most successful in the
pursuit of happiness, is not he who proposes
it to himself as the great object of his pursuit,
To do so, and to be continually occupied with
schemes on the subject, would fill the mind
with anxious conjectures about futurity, and
with perplexing calculations of the various
chances of good and evil. Whereas the man
whose ruling principle of action is a sense of
duty, conducts himself in the business of life
with boldness, consistency and dignity, and
finds himself rewarded with that happiness
which so often eludes the pursuit of those who
exert every faculty of the mind in order to
attain it.

Divine Providence has constituted the order
of things in such a sort, as to make the rule
of natural self-preservation consistent with
the fundamental principle of universal benevo-
lence, and the doing as we would be done by?
For my own part, I must confess, I never
could conceive that an all-wise, just, and
benevolent being would contrive to make that
to be our duty which is not, upon the whole
and generally speaking, — -even without the

8

consideration of a future state — our interest
likewise.

14 That which renders beings capable of
moral government is their having a moral
nature, and moral faculties of perception and
of action. That we have this moral approv-
ing and disapproving faculty is certain from
our experiencing it in ourselves, and recog-
nizing it in each other. It is manifest a
great part of common language and of com-
mon behavior over the world is formed upon
supposition of such a moral faculty, whether
called Conscience, Moral Reason, Moral Sense,
or Divine Reason, whether considered as a
sentiment [perception] of the Understanding,
or as a perception [sentiment] of the Heart,
or, which seems the truth, as including both.
Nor is it at all doubtful in the general what
course of action this faculty or practical dis-
cerning power within us approves, and what it
disapproves. For, as much as it has been
disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever
ground for doubt there may be about particu-
lars, yet in general there is in reality a uni-
versally acknowledged standard of it. It is
that which all ages and all countries have
made profession of in public, — it is that which

9

every man you meet puts on the show of, — it
is that which the primary and fundamental
laws of all civil constitutions over the face of
the earth make it their business and endeavor
to enforce the practice of, upon mankind,
namely justice, veracity, and regard to com-
mon good."

The intentions of nature, in associating the
ideas of the beautiful and the good, cannot be
mistaken. Much, I am persuaded, might be
done by a judicious system of education, in
following out the plan which nature has her-
self, in this instance, so manifestly traced ;
as we find, indeed was done to a very great
degree in those ancient schools, who con-
sidered it as the most important of all objects
to establish such a union between philosophy
and the fine arts, as might add to the natural
beauty of virtue every attraction which the
imagination could give her, and affords addi-
tional evidence of the beneficient solicitude
with which nature allures to the practice of
our duty.

"Do you imagine," says Socrates to Aris-
tippus, "that what is good is not beautiful ? "

How delightful are our feelings when we
are conscious of doing well ? By a species of

10

instinct we know ourselves to be the object of
the esteem and attachment of our fellow
creatures, and we feel that we enjoy the
approbation of the invisible witness of our
conduct.

Although, however, this sense of merit which
accompanies the performance, good actions con-
vinces the philosopher of the connexion which
the Deity has established between virtue and
happiness, he does not proceed on the supposi-
tion, that on particular occasions miraculous
interpositions are to be made in his favor.
That virtue is the most direct road to happi-
ness he sees to be the case even in this world ;
but he knows that the Deity governs by gen-
eral laws ; and when he feels himself dis-
appointed in the attainment of his wishes, he
acquiesces in bis lot, perseveres in well-doing,
and looks forward with hope to futurity.
This belief of the connexion between virtue
and good fortune has plainly taken its rise
from the natural connexion between the ideas
of virtue and merit, a connexion which, we
may rest assured, is agreeable to the general
laws by which the universe is governed,
although not always immediately apparent.

it

The strongest presumption of a future state
is deduced from our natural notions of right
and wrong ; of merit and demerit ; and from
a comparison between these and the general
course of human affairs.

The very notion of virtue implies the no-
tion of obligation. Every being who is con-
scious of the distinction between right and
wrong, carries about with him a law which
he is bound to observe notwithstanding he
may be in total ignorance of a future state.

"For when the Gentiles, which have not
the law, do by nature the things contained in
the law, these having not the law, are a law
unto themselves."

"Right, implies duty in its idea. To per-
ceive an action to be right, is to see a reason
for doing it in the action itself, abstracted
from ail other considerations whatever ; and
this perception, this acknowledged rectitude
in the action, is the very essence of obligation,
that which commands the approbation and
choice, and binds the conscience of every
rational human being/' We are under an
obligation to right, which is antecedent, and
in order and nature superior to all other.

12

Dr Clarke has expressed himself nearly to
the same purpose. "The judgment and con-
science of a man's own mind concerning the
reasonableness and fitness of the thing; is the
truest and formalest obligation ; for whoever
acts contrary to this sense and conscience of
his own mind is necessarily self -condemned ;
and the greatest and strongest of all obliga-
tions is that which a man cannot break
through without condemning himself. So far,
therefore, as men are conscious of what is
right and- wrong, so far they are under an
obligation to act accordingly."

This view of human nature is the most
simple, so it is the most ancient which occurs
in the history of moral science. It was the
doctrine of the Pythagorean school, as appears
from a fragment of Theages, a Pythagorean
writer, published in Gale's Opuscula Mytholo-
gica. It is also explained by Plato in some
of his dialogues.

Adam Smith says, "upon whatever we sup-
pose our moral faculties to be founded," I quote
his own words, "whether upon a certain modi-
fication of reason upon an original instinct
called a moral sense or upon some other prin-
ciple of our nature, it cannot be doubted that

13

they are given us for the direction of our con-
duct in this life. They carry along with them
the most evident badges of their authority,
which denote that they were set up within us
to be the supreme arbiters of all our actions ;
to superintend all our senses, passions, and
appetites ; and to judge how far* each of them
was to be either indulged or restrained.

"Since these, therefore," continues Mr Smith,
"were plainly intended to be the governing
principles of human nature, the rules which
they prescribe are to be regarded as the com-
mands and laws of the Deity promulgated by
those vicegerents which he has thus set up

within us By acting according to

their dictates we may be said, in some sense,
to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance,
as far as in our power, the plan of Provi-
dence.— Theory of Moral Sentiments.

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